



**COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL**

**RUSSELL COLEMAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL**

**1024 CAPITAL CENTER DRIVE
SUITE 200
FRANKFORT, KY 40601
(502) 696-5300**

25-OMD-260

September 16, 2025

In re: Randall Weddle/London City Council

Summary: The London City Council (“the Council”) did not violate the Open Meetings Act (“the Act”) by holding its meeting at a location that was inconvenient to the public.

Open Meetings Decision

On August 22, 2025, Randall Weddle¹ (“Appellant”) submitted a complaint to the Council member who served as the chair and presiding officer of the Council’s August 15, 2025, meeting.² The Appellant alleges that the room in which the Council held the August 15 meeting “was insufficient to provide adequate space to the members of the public who wished to attend” and therefore violated KRS 61.840, which requires agencies to “provide meeting room conditions, including adequate space, seating, and acoustics, which insofar as is feasible allow effective public observation of the public meetings.” As a remedy, the Appellant requested that the Council “reconvene in an appropriate venue to reconsider its actions and cease from taking any action on any items voted upon at the subject meeting.”

In a timely response, the Council denied that it had violated the Act, stating that there was sufficient space in the meeting room for people to observe the meeting and that the meeting alternatively could be viewed online. This appeal followed

¹ At the time he submitted his complaint, Randall Weddle was the City of London’s mayor.

² Under KRS 61.846(1), a complainant must submit his or her complaint to the “presiding officer of the public agency suspected of” violating the Act. Normally, “[t]he mayor shall preside at meetings of the council.” KRS 83A.130(5). However, because the mayor is the complainant here, and because the August 15 meeting considered amending the charges against him for which he could have been removed from office under KRS 83A.040(9), he satisfied KRS 61.846(1) by submitting his complaint to the Council member who presided over the meeting in question.

When a public agency conducts a meeting under the Act, it is required to “provide meeting room conditions, including adequate space, seating, and acoustics, which insofar as is feasible allow effective public observation of the public meeting.” KRS 61.840. According to the Appellant, “[n]umerous members of the public were unable to enter the room,” and “there was inadequate space, seating, and acoustics to allow ‘effective public observation of the public meeting.’” The Appellant further stated that, after the Council’s presiding officer was notified of the alleged violation, her response was to “invite members of the public to enter the room to ‘stand along the wall’ and take a ‘seat on the floor.’”

For its part, the Council disagrees with the Appellant’s assessment on how full the room was. It states that “calls were made asking those in the hallway to come inside the room as there was space for those wishing to attend to come into the room” and that the chair stated there was room “to line up against the wall and even sit in the floor if so desired.” The Council also states that it notified the public that the meeting could be watched live on its social media page.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that the Act “does not impose upon government agencies the requirement to conduct business only in the *most* convenient locations at the *most* convenient times.” *Knox Cnty. v. Hammons*, 129 S.W.3d 839, 845 (Ky. 2004) (emphasis in original). In *Hammons*, the Court considered whether a meeting of a public agency violated KRS 61.840 “because it did not allow ‘effective public observation’ of the proceedings.” *Id.* at 844. Describing the meeting in question, the Court stated, “It is undisputed that numerous citizens were not able to enter the crowded district courtroom and observed the proceedings from the hallways.” *Id.* However, the Court ultimately held that the agency had not violated KRS 61.840 because “there is nothing on the record to indicate that persons wishing to attend or participate in the proceeding were effectively prevented from doing so.” *Id.* at 845. In so holding, the Court stated that the Act is “designed to prevent government bodies from conducting its business at such inconvenient times or locations as to effectively render public knowledge or participation impossible, not to require such agencies to seek out the most convenient time or location.” *Id.*

Here, both parties agree that the available seating in the meeting room had been exhausted. But they disagree regarding whether the additional room for observation in the meeting room, *i.e.*, standing along the wall or sitting on the floor, satisfied the requirements of the Act. Accepting the Appellant’s viewpoint as true, it appears the Council’s August 15 meeting was analogous to the meeting at issue in *Hammons*, insofar as citizens at both meetings “were not able to enter the crowded

[room] and observed the proceedings from the hallway.”³ *Id.* at 844. In *Hammons*, the Court reasoned that, although the meeting room in question “might not have been the most convenient . . . location to hold the meeting, it certainly was not an inconvenient . . . location. *The fact that a large number of citizens did attend proves this point.*” *Id.* at 845 (emphasis added). Similarly, here, although the Council’s meeting room may not have been the most convenient location, the fact that a large number of citizens were able to attend the meeting demonstrates that it was not an inconvenient location.

At bottom, the record before the Office does not indicate that the Council’s meeting location was so inconvenient “as to effectively render public knowledge or participation impossible.” Accordingly, the Office cannot find that the Council violated KRS 61.840.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General shall be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of the complaint emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.

**Russell Coleman
Attorney General**

/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General

#444

Distributed to:

Randall Weddle, Mayor, City of London
Carmine Iaccarino, Esq.
Kelly Green, Presiding Chair, London City Council
Larry G. Bryson, London City Attorney
Conrad Cessna Esq., Counsel, London City Council

³ To the extent citizens were able to at least enter the August 15 meeting room, it appears they had a greater ability to view the proceedings than the citizens in the *Hammons* decision.