



COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY  
**OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL**

**RUSSELL COLEMAN**  
**ATTORNEY GENERAL**

**1024 CAPITAL CENTER DRIVE**  
**SUITE 200**  
**FRANKFORT, KY 40601**  
**(502) 696-5300**

**25-ORD-139**

May 27, 2025

In re: Bobby Ellison/City of London

**Summary:** The Office cannot find that the City of London (“the City”) violated the Open Records Act (“the Act”) because the Office is unable to resolve the factual dispute between the parties regarding whether the Appellant resided in Laurel County at the time of his request.

***Open Records Decision***

Bobby Ellison (“Appellant”) submitted a request to the City for a database logging all records requests the city received between January 1, 2025, and April 1, 2025. In response, the City stated that, because the Appellant is a resident of the Laurel County, it was electing to require him to inspect the records in person before receiving copies. This appeal followed.

Under KRS 61.872(2)(a), “[a]ny resident of the Commonwealth shall have the right to inspect public records.” Inspection of public records on the agency’s premises is the basic right provided by the Act. “*Upon inspection*, the applicant shall have the right . . . to obtain copies of all public records not exempted by the terms of KRS 61.878.” KRS 61.874(1) (emphasis added). Thus, under KRS 61.874(1), a requester’s right to obtain copies of records is conditioned on his prior inspection of those records. *See, e.g.*, OAG 76-375 (finding that “[t]he right to have copies of records is ancillary to the right of inspection and does not stand by itself,” and therefore, “[i]f a person has not inspected the records he desires to copy[,] there is no requirement that copies of any records must be delivered to him”); OAG 82-629 (finding that the Act “does not contemplate that a public agency shall send requested records to a person who has not inspected them”).

In 1992, the General Assembly enacted KRS 61.872(3), which provides that public records may be inspected either “[d]uring the regular office hours of the public

agency” or “[b]y receiving copies of the public records from the public agency through the mail.” The second alternative, however, is not available to all requesters. Rather, “[t]he public agency shall mail copies of the public records *to a person whose residence or principal place of business is outside the county in which the public records are located* after he or she precisely describes the public records which are readily available within the public agency.” KRS 61.872(3)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, a person who does not live or work outside the county where the records are located is not entitled to receive copies without having first inspected the records in person at the facility provided by the agency. *See Commonwealth v. Chestnut*, 250 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Ky. 2008) (finding that “KRS 61.872(3)(b) seemingly applies when someone residing outside the county in which the public records are located desires to receive copies of the public records through the mail,” not a person “in the same county as the records kept by the custodian”); *see also* 97-ORD-46 (finding that “[a] requester who both lives and works in the same county where the public records are located may be required to inspect the records prior to receiving copies”); 92-ORD-1620 (finding that KRS 61.872(3)(b) “reflects a concern that persons residing outside the county where the records are maintained should not be compelled to travel great distances in order to inspect those records”).

The City’s denial asserted that the Appellant resides or has his principal place of business within Laurel County, where the record is located. In response, the Appellant asserts that he no longer resides in Laurel County. Specifically, he states that he “no longer live[s] at the address [the City] ha[s] on file.” On appeal, the City maintains that the Appellant resides in Laurel County and argues that his statement on appeal does not deny that assertion. Thus, a factual dispute exists between the parties regarding whether the Appellant resided in Laurel County at the time of his request.<sup>1</sup>

At bottom, the City asserts the Appellant resides in Laurel County, even as the Appellant maintains he no longer lives in Laurel County. The Office has regularly found it is unable to resolve factual disputes between the parties to an appeal under KRS 61.880(2)(a). *See, e.g.*, 22-ORD-219; 19-ORD-083; 03-ORD-061; OAG 89-81. Thus, the Office cannot resolve the dispute between the parties regarding whether the Appellant resided in Laurel County at the time of his request.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Office notes that the record currently before it differs from the record in 25-ORD-124. That appeal involved the same parties as this appeal. Addressing the same issue, the Office concluded that the Appellant was a resident of Laurel County at the time he submitted his request because he disclosed a Laurel County zip code where he lived in his request. Here, the Appellant did not state or otherwise indicate that he was a resident of Laurel County at any point. Thus, the record before the Office in this appeal presents a factual dispute as to this issue.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the appropriate circuit court under KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days from the date of this decision. Under KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of the complaint emailed to [OAGAppeals@ky.gov](mailto:OAGAppeals@ky.gov).

**Russell Coleman**  
**Attorney General**

/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer  
Zachary M. Zimmerer  
Assistant Attorney General

#183

Distributed to:

Bobby Ellison  
Katelin McPeek, London City Clerk  
Larry G. Bryson, London City Attorney  
Randall Weddle, Mayor, City of London